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DO SOME OF THE MAJOR POSTULATES OF THE
LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES NEED
RE-EXAMINATION?
JOSEPH

F. FRANcis*

Once we choose our postulates our destiny is fixed. If we do not
like our conclusions we may change our postulates.' If our postulates
do not cover the facts of experience or become too cumbersome to
cover most of the facts, then they must be cast aside for shorter and
more descriptive statements if they are to be useful. 2 Such has been
the history of science, and if law is to be won from the ranks of emotionalism and the medicine man to the ranks of science the major
postulates of the law and its branches must be frequently re-examined
with the view to discarding those generalizations that are no longer
descriptive of judicial behavior.3
It is the thesis of this paper, not only that the law of bills and notes
contains many dead and useless postulates but that the major postulates from which most of the broad generalizations of the law of
bills and notes flow are out of date and no longer descriptive. 4 I refer
to such generalization as, "A negotiable instrument is a substitute
for money"' and "Like money a negotiable instrument is intended to
have a definite value and to be taken almost at sight." The converse
of these statements is almost always expressed or implied, i.e., "An
*Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law School.
IKEYSER, MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY, A STUDY IN FATE AND FREEDOM (1922)

5. ".

. .We

may now speak of ideas as constituting a world-the world of ideas.

With that world all human beings as human beings have to deal-there is no escape;
it is there and only there that foundations are found-foundations for science,
foundations for philosophy, foundations for art, foundations for religion, for ethics,
for government and education; it is in the world of ideas and only there that
human beings as human may find principles or bases for rational theories and
rational conduct of life; choices differ but some choice of principles we must make
if we are to be really human-if, that is, we are to be rational-and when we have
made it, we are at once bound by a destiny of consequences beyond the power
of passion or will to control or modify; another election of principles is but the
election of another destiny. The world of ideas is, you see, the empire of Fate."
2See chapter on "Nature of Principles," DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT (1922) 238ff.

3Cook, The Present Status of the "Lack of Mutuality" Rule (1927) 36 YALE L.

J. 897.
'Infra note 25.
'Chafee, Acceleration Provisionsin Time Paper (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 747,

749 ff. This citation is given merely as an illustration and like statements will
be found in almost any treatise, article, or opinion on bills and notes.
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instrument that is not a substitute for money is not negotiable" and
"If the instrument does not have a definite value and cannot be
safely taken at sight it is not negotiable." From these postulates
flow a series of others generally designated as "formal requisites"
for a negotiable instrument, such as, "The instrument must contain
words of negotiability; must contain an order or a promise; the order
or promise must be unconditional and not accompanied with an
order or promise to do something else besides pay money. The
instrument must be payable in money with the amount, time, and
parties certainly designated,"' 6 etc. Closely allied to these major
assumptions and their corrolaries there are the assumptions, often
implicit, that the law of bills and notes is unique in that all bills and
notes cases are non-unique as to each other;7 that there is no twilight
zone between negotiable and non-negotiable paper;8 that here above all
places the social interest of certainty overrides individualized justice
from case to case. 9 Every objection is silenced with, "Thus sayeth
the Law Merchant" or "Thus sayeth the Custom of Merchants."
Then to prove what this oracular Law Merchant says, we are cited to
Coke or Mansfield who in turn called in merchants to tell what was
the custom of merchants some centuries before.
Due to this attitude, more or less peculiar to the law of bills and
notes, the learning of this subject contained in its many postulates
has become mummifed in the Negotiable Instruments Law. The
great reel, "The Romance of the Law Merchant," has ceased to move
as though the operator had come to a scene that pleased him so
thoroughly that he insists on locking the crank. Some hand of
destiny seems to grasp the crank and the show goes on in spite of the
warnings of the management that this is only an illusion and what
the spectators really see and should see is the perfect sixteenth century
court scene. The writer has for some time begun to wonder if this
towering Law Merchant might not possibly be one of Time's ghosts
6

N. I. L. §§ I-II.

7

POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923)

"Every promissory note

is like every other." at 154 and, "There is nothing unique in a bill of exchange."
at 155.
8
Chafee, op. cit. supra note 5, at 750: "There must be no twilight zone between
negotiable instruments and simple contracts."
Neal v. Coburn, 92 Me. 139, 145, 42 Atl. 348 (1898): "Commercial paper has

long been governed by special rules which, while designed to insure justice, are
also designed to insure the safe use of an indispensable commercial agency.
The commercial world needs and seeks for the plain and workable rule rather
than for the somewhat uncertain abstract right in each case." Noticed in Chafee,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 750-751.
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stalking generation after generation, to be soon shown up as an old
fraud holding sway by its very mystery. Suffice it here to suggest
that most of the questions that purport to be resolved by the Law
Merchant were not within the dreams of the merchants of the
sixteenth century. When the writer confesses that he had great
difficulty in explaining the cases in the light of the major postulates
and keeping his self respect, it is believed that he is making a confession in which most teachers of bills and notes will generally
sympathize.
The reader may at this point agree with the implications of this
paper and say, "Very true, and if I were to make anew the whole law
of bills and notes today I would make it very different but we have
to deal with the law as it is and it is now too late to make many
desirable changes that might otherwise be made. I might provide
that the fact that a promise is conditional should not affect the
negotiability of the note if there are words of negotiability, and so on,
but I take it that it is too late to consider such questions as open
today." It must be admitted that there is some force to this objection, but in view of the fact that we are about to revise our Negotiable
Instruments Law and in view of the further fact that in doubtful
cases our postulates and especially our major postulates will influence
our decisions, it is submitted there is great value in re-examining
these postulates apart from the very valuable mental exercise one
gets from questioning one's most fundamental convictions that are
generally accepted as self-evident. 0
Is a bill or a note a substitute for money? In a sense, of course, all
credit is a substitute for money. What is generally meant here by
substitute for money is the quality of a good medium of payment and
exchange. Most commodities from strawberries to gold have this
quality to a widely varying extent. What gives money its unique
character is its acceptability. Bills and notes have wider degrees of
acceptability than do commodities. Most commodities are worth
something, many bills and notes are worth nothing. Another reason
that bills and notes can never really closely approach money is because of the risk of the so-called "real defenses" which every purchaser assumes. Some bills and notes make fairly good media of
exchange and payment, many do not, but nearly all of them are good
instruments of credit. Most credit is assignable and more and more
of it is becoming negotiable in the sense that the buyer takes free of
10

HOLUES, COLLECTED PAPERS (1921) 306: "To rest on a formula is a slumber,
that prolonged means death." And at 307, "To have doubted one's own first
principles is the mark of a civilized man."
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equities. It was once thought that some great principle of public
policy was violated by the assignment of credit and hence it was not
allowed. The considerations of policy have never been clearly
defined, however, and much ex post facto reasoning has had to justify
the curious.' Something of the same mystery surrounds the judicial
and professorial attitude of today that will not grant the quality of
negotiability to instruments of credit where the parties concerned
have evidenced such expectations, if some slip has been made in the
"Meny, Miny, Mow," or the formal requisites. But when we look
less closely from judicial vocal behavior to judicial non-vocal behavior, we find much strange ignoring of the "formal requisites" and
stranger rationalizations that would make it appear that the formal
requisites are still observed. Somewhat shame-facedly the courts
still have an eye on the reasonable expectation of the parties and
individual justice from case to case. 12 Nevertheless, it must be
admitted that one of the last strongholds of formalism in our law is
still to be found in our law of bills and notes.
The proposition that bills and notes never have been, never can be
and never will be a good substitute for money is so obvious that it is
incredible. 13 That acceptability is not the test of negotiability in the
"That to allow the assignment of choses in action Would encourage litigation,
is probably an afterthought. Cf. chapter on "The Alienability of Choses in
Action" Am~s, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 211: "A right of action in one
person implies a corresponding duty in another to perform an agreement or to
make reparation for a tort. That is to say a chose in action always presupposes a
personal relation between two individuals. But a personal relation in the very
nature of things cannot be assigned."
12One can hardly come on to a case in bills and notes without finding an illustration. See, for instance, Shenionia v. Verda, 24 Ohio App. 246, 157 N. B. 717
(1927) where the court found the following language to constitute a "promise:"
"I borrowed from P. Shemonia, the sum of five hundred dollars with four
percent interest. The borrowed money ought to be paid within four months
from date." Any text on bills and notes or any annotation of the Negotiable
Instruments Law is incorporated here by reference to show the length the courts in
fact go to find that the formal requisite in question is found in the instrument,
There are suprisingly few instruments, relatively speaking, held non-negotiable
because of formal defects even where only a crystal gazer could by the widest
flights of imagination see, in any realistic sense, that there is a promise or order
that is unconditional and for an amount certain, etc. A complete development
of this point from the cases would require a paper to itself.
" Consider, for example, the proposition: A frightened ostrich buries its head
in the sand. Is the Proposition true? We observe at once that the proposition
is not self-evident, even if we admit that there are such things as self-evident
propositions, for, if it were no one would believe it, which many do, but all
would know it, which many do not. Cf. .EYSER, THINKING ABOUT THINKING
(1926) 84.
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law of bills and notes is quickly demonstrated by comparing the
note or check of John Doe, an insolvent tramp, to that of the General
Motors Corporation. If the John Doe paper is in due form regardless
of its acceptibility, it is negotiable; if that of the General Motors is
rendered more acceptable by violating the magical form it is nonnegotiable. Negotiability is in point of law a matter of form and
form alone has little correlation to acceptability. If this is true, then
the great major postulate and its converse of the law of bills and notes
are not descriptive and being non-descriptive they become positively
harmful and confusing, for from them the courts have extracted
several corrolaries which they accept as principles or rules with which
to decide the cases. Now it is well known that if the major proposition is false, any corrolaries drawn from it must also be false. In so
far as courts are actually influenced by these principles and rules,
which, no doubt, is very little, so far we are apt to get undesirable
results in the cases. It may then be worth our while to look a little
more closely at these minor assumptions to see how they work.
Since a negotiable instrument is a substitute for money and like
money is intended to have a definite value and to be taken almost at
sight, it follows that "it must contain an unconditional promise or
order to pay a sum certain in money.'" 14 Here we have in fact five
propositions in one: There must be a promise or order. The promise
or order must be to pay. The promise or order must be unconditional.
There must be a promise or order to pay a sum certain. This sum
certain must be in money. If our major postulate is true we can not
quarrel much with these assumptions. A few moments of examination
of the cases reveal one or the other of these two conclusions: Either
these terms (or rather propositions) have a highly technical (nonnormative) meaning; or else, the cases do not support the propositions.
If the reader prefers the first conclusion, what is left of the major
postulate? How is the layman to know by mere inspection what is a
promise, or order, to pay, 'a sum certainin money ?15 How is he to know
14

N. I. L. §§ I, 2.
"5Would a layman know before the courts so decided that the following are
Promises: "Due John Adams $94.91 on demand...,"
"Due one Huyck or
order...," "Good to bearer." "Payable upon the return of this certificate [of
deposit]," "On demand... please pay," where there is no drawee. "Borrowed
of," "I hereby accept this bill," written on a bill without a drawee or on a sales
slip. "Good for $ioo," "Pay P or order," no drawee. "I. 0. U. $ioo value received," etc. These and many additional cases are collected in 8 C. J. xlS, I6.
Orders: "Credit," "Let the bearer have," "We hereby authorize you to pay,"
Sheets v. Coast Coal Co., 133 Pac. 433 (Wash. 1913). Contra: Hamilton v.
Spottiswood, 4 Ex. 200 (1849), "Mr. B. will much oblige Mr. A. by paying C.
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what is unconditional
by mere inspection of the instrument? If,
on the other hand we accept the conclusion that these terms are to
be taken in their normative sense then we must also conclude that
the great majority of the cases are wrongly decided. In other words,
when we distinguish what the courts do from what they say, there
seems to be little logical connection between the major assumption
and these minor assumptions.
When we seek a realistic description of what the courts are in fact
doing, we see that they are declaring many conditional notes and bills
to be negotiable. Why not? Suppose Oklahoma declared that conditionality of a bill or note does not affect its negotiability, what
would be the alarming results that would flow from such legislation? 7 Or suppose "I.O.U.'s"' 8 or promises to pay in commodities"9 not money were held to be negotiable, what calamitous results
would follow? It is here, of course, assumed that the parties to the
transaction had reasonable expectations of these being treated as

or order," etc. See NORTON, BILLS AWD NoTEs (4th ed. 1914) for additional
citations.
To pay: "I promise to account to P. or order," Morris v. Lee, I Strange, 629
(K. B. 1725); "I promise to settle with P. or order," Barker v. Seaman, 61 N. Y.
648 (1875); "Credit A. or order in cash," Allen v. Sea etc. Co., 9 C. B. 574 (1870).
A sum certain: A provision requiring a higher rate of interest after maturity, or
a provision requiring interest on interest, or a discount of interest or principal if
paid before maturity. Cases collected in 2 A. L. R.. 139. Provisions requiring
the maker to pay taxes, assessments, and insurance on property securing the
note. See cases collected in 45 A. L. R. 1074.
In money: How many business men would consider money to mean only legal
tender, and how many business men could tell now what money is legal tender?

See Oliphant, The Theory of Money in the Law of CommercialInstruments (1919)
29 YALE L. J. 606.
16A note payable on December Ist, of one year or a year later if the crop on

certain land fell "below eight bushels per acre," "At my convenience, upon this
expressed condition: that I am to be the sole judge of such convenience and time
of payment," "when ship F. arrives," "On demand," "At sight," "In the course
of the strawberry season now coming on," "If there is not enough realized by
good management in one year, to have more time to pay," "Upon the death of A,"
"As per contract," notes with a great variety of acceleration provisions on the
happening of certain events. See NORTON, op. cit. supra note I5, at 43ff and
Chafee, op. cit. supranote 5, at 753ff. Also Aigler, Conditional Order or Promise
(1928) 26 MICH. L. REV. 471.

17N. I. L. § 4 provides for three distinct types of conditional (as to time) bills

and notes.
18I. 0. U.'shave at times been held negotiable. See many cases collected in 8
C. 3. 1I6n.
'"Such is now the case in Illinois and Georgia. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw (4th ed. 1926) 4.

EXAMINATION OF LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES

47

negotiable, as, by so expressly designating. The implication here
suggested is that not only would there be no bad results but that this
would be a sensible way to decide such cases. To the objection that
these instruments would have an uncertain and speculative value it is
suggested that this is true of most negotiable paper. After all is said
and done the chief factors of uncertainty are the solvency, honesty,
and business ingenuity of the parties primarily liable. These vary as
humanity varies in these qualities, and this never has been misunderstood by business men. This requires inquiry off the face of the
instrument. In the face of frequent utterances to the contrary it is
submitted that of all branches of our law, certainty in bills and notes
is a delusion. If it is answered that this is true but paper would be
more certain and hence have a wider circulation if the promise is unconditional, etc., we have what appears to be, at first sight, a very
pertinent reply. Is there any social interest in making credit circulate
beyond that dictated by its economic worth? Bonds would circulate
more freely if they were not subject to call. Is this sufficient reason
to hold such bearer bonds non-negotiable? If circulation is desirable,
as normal circulation is, why not protect and encourage normal
circulation by holding this class of paper negotiable when such is the
reasonable expectation of the parties? A conditional note is not worth
as much as an unconditional one but it may be worth more than no
note at all. If circulation is a good thing why not encourage the
circulation of both conditional and unconditional notes, notes payable
in foreign money as well as those payable in credit, trade or commodities, when all the parties to them treat them as negotiable? Just as it
was once fallaciously supposed that a person could not limit his
liability by expressed agreement of the other parties, 0 it is still assumed, fallaciously it is submitted, that a person cannot increase his
liability by waiving certain defenses by expressed agreement. 21 The
former has resulted in thinking too exclusively in the form of Corporations and the latter by thinking too exclusively in the form of the Law
Merchant. There is an analogous mystery abiding in both of these
terms.
When the writer was a boy and lived in the Willamette Valley it
was the almost universal custom for hop growers to issue little paste2

oCf. Hohfeld, Stockholders' IndividualLiability (19o9) 9 COL. L. REv. 285, 29 8ff

and
cases there cited.
21

See an interesting note in (1924).33 YALE L. J. 302, The PartialNegotiabilsty of

Irregular Instruments. Cf. EWART, ESTOPPEL (1900) 24; Aigler, Recognition
of New Types of Negotiable Instruments (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 563; Kidd, The
Negotiability of Bonds in Californiaand the N. I. L. (1917) 6 CALIF. L. REv. 444.
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board "hop checks" on which was printed, "Good for One Box of
Hops." One of these checks was issued to the hop-picker for each
box of hops picked. This check did not entitle the picker to a box of
hops as the check seems to indicate but to fifty cents for the picking of
a box of hops. During the season, these checks almost replaced
money as a medium of exchange and were quite universally accepted
there as fifty cent pieces. Byeustom all the parties concerned treated
these as negotiable. Although the writer has been unable to find a
case in point he is tempted to venture a guess that a court would have
held these negotiable if a case had arisen, the N.I.L. to the contrary
notwithstanding. They met a real business need and the reasonable
expectation of all the parties concerned was clear. They were not as
good as money but if they had not been freely accepted in payment
for groceries, etc., hop-picking would have been seriously interfered
with. Considerable credit re-arrangements would have been made
necessary.
One other objection is anticipated at this point, namely, "It is not
desirable that all credit should be considered negotiable. We must
then have two classes of instruments, negotiable and non-negotiable.
Negotiable paper should clearly carry its character on its face and
for this purpose it is highly desirable that we have some formal
distinguishing features. There should be no twilight zone between
negotiable paper and non-negotiable paper. It is better to disappoint
some of the reasonable expectations of the parties of doubtful paper
for the sake of keeping the character of negotiable paper clear and
unmistakable.". This sounds familiar but is it more than that?
Any teacher of bills and notes well knows that there are tremendous
twilight zones in bills and notes, that every doubtful case is a unique
case, and that for every formal requisite you have a twilight zone.
Then the fewer the formal requisites the less uncertainty. Every
time a pigeon-hole is created uncertainty is added whether in bills or
notes or any other subject of the law. Pigeon-holes are often necessary to differentiate different legal consequences on operative facts
that'require different treatment, but it is difficult to see why some
dozen formal requirements should be necessary today to distinguish
negotiable paper from non-negotiable paper. It is doubted, for instance, if there is any good reason today why the promise or order
may not be accompanied with a promise or order to do sbmething
else besides pay money. The same objection may be made to most
of the other formal requisites. Some form; no doubt, is necessary but
why not stop with "writing" and some form of "words of negotiability?" If such were the law and business accepted it as such, it is
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difficult to perceive any great evil consequences. On the other hand
the writer suggests that there would be more certainty in business
transactions, that credit would be more liquid, and that the reasonable business expectations of men would not be so frequently
disappointed as they are under our present system.
This question is sure to rise: "If law follows custom and not custom
the law, why have not the needs of business and business custom forced
upon the law this simpler and better form of negotiable paper?"
To a certain extent it is true that law follows custom and that the law
is made for business and not business for the law. Is it not also true
that the law to a considerable extent determines custom by sanctioning and rejecting certain customs? Business practice is frequently,
by an old custom, converted into law and the power of the law has
been so strong that business has accepted the custom with all its
attendant evils as a matter of course. More frequently business has
demanded a change of custom long before it could get the attention of
the law makers.Y When the law is then changed business rushes to
the new custom and it soon becomes well known in the business world.
It is possible that this contains a partial answer to the question why
business has not forced out of use the formal requisites of a negotiable
bill or note.
If bills and notes were really a substitute for money, not only
would risks of insolvency and risks of real defenses have to be greatly
decreased and standardized, but the form of the paper would have to
be such that a prospective purchaser could readily calculate the
present worth of the paper. To do this he must be certain when he is
to be paid, how much, the present market value of money, and what
interest his paper bears. That is, he must be certain as to when he is
to be paid as well as to whether he is to be paid. There must be no
contingencies or fluctuations inconsistent with money. Disregarding
risks of solvency and risks of real defenses for the moment, what
classes of current commercial paper would we have to rule out under
this standard? Interest-bearing "on demand" paper is of uncertain
value and it is impossible to figure its present worth for it may be
paid off at any time, and the advantage of investment due to a higher
rate of interest on the note or bond over the current market value
of money lost. The same thing is true of paper payable "on or before" a certain date; likewise, paper construed to be payable within
a reasonable time; so also, paper payable on an event certain to
22

In so far as the courts have only given lip-service to the major postulates and
formal requisites of bills and notes and have declared many instruments that do
not conform to the formal requisites to be negotiable, business has had its way.
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happen but uncertain when. While paper containing options in the
holder in respect to acceleration of maturity, discount before maturity, etc., should be held negotiable, conditional indorsements and
conditional acceptances would have to be disallowed. Such, of course,
is not the law, and the attempt to cling to the postulates of bills and
notes and yet justify and explain the decisions on the subject is one
of the most curious chapters in the history of our law. The writer
has known a few teachers of the subject to declare that the great
body of decisions indicated above are wrong. It is submitted that an
equally tenable explanation is that the postulates are wrong.
It is beyond the scope of this papern to consider the postulates
with respect to negotiation and with respect to "holder in due course"
but it is here suggested that a little examination will find several
postulates here also that need serious reconsideration, especially with
respect to what constitutes "value," "good faith," and "notice."
Since the time of the Law Merchant, since the time of Coke, or
even since the time of Lord Mansfield, the postulates of business have
undergone a development that almost amounts to a complete revolution.n Time was when the seller was the little fellow and the buyer
was the big fellow who-was regarded with all the suspicion of a money
lender. The seller must be protected and the buyer must take care.
Little significance was attached to intangible property and of the
tangible property little protection was thrown around "exchange
value," as distinguished from the "use value." "Security of property"
in this very narrow sense, was the great major postulate of business
as well as that of the law. From this flow the postulates of various
rules of law, as, caveat emptor, no man can be deprived of his property
without his consent, no man can pass a better title than he himself
had, and many others of like tenor. An innocent buyer from a thief,
borrower, pledgee, or bailee for a special purpose not only lost what he
bought but was liable in an action for conversion.
Today the seller is the big fellow to be watched and the buyer is the
little fellow to be protected. The importance of intangible property
greatly exceeds that of the tangible. It is seen that "security of
property" has little meaning if there is not also security of the
exchange value of property and hence, "security of transaction" and
the protection of all varieties of intangible property is the order of the
day. Choses in action have become freely assignable and several
varieties of these have become negotiable. The protection given the
SAnd only a few of the formal requisites could be considered.
24
Isaacs, Business Postulates and the Law (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 1014,

1020.
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purchaser today as compared to a few decades ago is well illustrated
in the recent developments in the "apparent authority" doctrine in
agency, in the tendency to take illegal contracts out of the field of
self help, and especially in the development of the doctrine of
ultra vires in corporations, and in the public registration of documents
of title. So legislation establishing various commissions to regulate
trade, transportation, sale of securities, etc., shows the shifted emphasis
on the protection of the buyer. The first great step in the recognition
and protection of intangible property and the protection of the buyer
in our law was made when the principle of negotiability was first
applied to bills and then to notes. This was a great radical step forward in a rural age. There necessarily followed much justifying,
limiting and defining of negotiability which, improperly accepted,
resulted in a mummification of the law of bills and notes from which
it has never revived. An opinion on bills and notes often gives the
impression that it is timeless. Like a circus, when you have seen one
of them you have seen them all. Lord Mansfield might well be taken
as the author of nearly any opinion from his day to almost the last
opinion of the supreme court on a question involving the negotiability of commercial paper. About as much may be said with reference to many text books on the subject. They nearly all contain the
familiar but meaningless phrases, as, "the currency of the thing",
"substitute for money", "money likeness", "Custom of Merchants",
"according to the Law Merchant", "highly special legal consequences
of negotiability", "a courrier without luggage", "acceptable at sight",
etc., etc. Here at last we have a beautiful, still picture in the-law, almost a realization of the ideal of certainty made secure by codification
a set-form opinion for all possible cases. Is there not still too much
variation in the opinions? Does it not remain now for the Commissioners on Uniform Laws to write a model-form opinion to be followed
byall courts in all bills and notes cases, allowing a blank line or two at
the end for local color? At least such is often the impression one gets
when reading many opinions, law review articles, or text books on
negotiable instruments.
The subject badly needs a new language, new postulates, and a
new approach.
5These rationalizations have been raised to major postulates; as such, they
never were sound but in a day when credit was neither assignable nor negotiable,
they did suggest analogies that gave the illusion that the law as to assignability
of choses in action was not being changed. In this respect they once served a
useful purpose. Some will insist that these postulates were true in the time of
Coke and Mansfield in that they represented the best then known from then
available data-with this we do not quarrel.

